

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Project IM - 208

OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

Project Proposal Memorandum

Date: 8 August '49

To: B/FE

From: Staff Intelligence Group, Projects Planning

Subject: Communist methods in Asia.

Statement of Project

Origin: NSC Staff

Problem: To highlight Communist methods in Asia, with particular emphasis on those methods peculiar to Asia.

Assumptions:

Scope: Might well take form of a list with comment or elaboration on each item.

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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM NO. 208

26 August 1949

SUBJECT: Communist Methods in Asia

1. General Considerations.

Soviet theory envisages a "coalition" between the "proletarian revolution" (Communist governments and movements) in Europe and the "colonial revolution" in Asia, in order to build a "united world front of revolution against the world front of imperialism." This front is to be supported "directly or determinedly" by Communist movements everywhere.

The USSR, its satellites, and other "advanced" Communist Parties assist the local Communist organizations through diplomatic missions, trade delegations, propaganda and "cultural" activity, international organizations (labor, women's, youth), and by providing financial assistance, organizational specialists, advisers, and in some cases weapons.

Communist methods in Asia derive largely from the Leninist-Stalinist doctrine governing revolutions in colonial and semi-colonial areas. This doctrine differs in several respects from that advanced for more developed industrial countries.

2. Encouragement of National Movements.

The foremost Communist appeal in Asia is to the desire for national independence and the elimination of Western "colonial" influence. Local Communist Parties exploit national movements and attempt to lead them or to attach themselves to the groups which are leading them. Communists attempt to form a "National Front" with all significant forces of society, including the bourgeoisie and landowners, against the foreign colonial and "imperialist" powers. If local nationalist leaders cannot be induced to support this cause, they are attacked as puppets. Communists seek to reduce Western influence by propaganda against Western governments (including the US, which is accused of controlling the home governments of colonial powers) and against the local activities of Western representatives, by discrediting Western institutions, destroying Western property, and physically attacking Westerners and those who work for them. Nationalism and "anti-imperialism" are the principal issues in Indochina and Indonesia, and

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are major issues in every other country of the Far East. The national movement in most of these countries is regarded by the USSR as susceptible to Soviet exploitation and as working to the ultimate advantage of the Soviet Union. The important exceptions, in Soviet eyes, appear to be India and Indonesia, in which the national movement is effectively anti-Communist.

b. Appeal to Peasantry rather than to Proletariat.

Because most of Asia is not industrialized, the Communists usually concentrate on obtaining the support of the peasantry, until such time as there is a proletariat capable of becoming the "spearhead" of the revolution. A Communist movement which rises to power on the base of an organized and armed peasantry after achieving power —e.g., in China will begin deliberately to subordinate the interest of the peasantry to that of the proletariat. In the course of this rise, slogans for agrarian reform and opposition to landlordism are advanced to win peasant support. Although collectivization of the land is regarded as the ultimately "correct" solution of the land problem and the problem of controlling the peasantry, it is not to be introduced on a large scale until the Communist regime is firmly entrenched and no longer is dependent on peasant support. The peasantry already provides the principal support of the Communists in China and Burma. Peasant support is important to the Communist movements of India, Indochina, and the Philippines, and the peasantry is a source of significant (though not major) support in Korea, Japan, and Indonesia.

c. Use of Organized Armed Force against the Government, whether Colonial or Native.

According to Communist doctrine, colonial peoples can gain independence only by successful armed overthrow of the foreign ruler. Asian nations which have attained independence from their colonial powers—Burma, the Philippines, and India—are still regarded as "colonial," being merely under a new form of "imperialist" control rather than genuinely independent.

Guerrilla and para-military forces are important elements in Communist attempts to seize power. Guerrilla leaders are often convinced Communists, and intensive efforts are made by the Communist to indoctrinate the rank-and-file with Communist theory. In order to neutralize the armed forces of the government, Communists are constantly infiltrating and agitating among the most important armed units.

Communist-led armed forces have been active in all states of the Far East (except India, Thailand, and Japan) since World War II. Guerrilla forces concentrate on harrassing actions—cutting communications

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and raiding supplies—and generally engage only isolated government detachments in battle. Where the Communists have gained sufficient military strength (as in China), large-scale orthodox campaigns are undertaken. Guerrilla activity in Southeast Asia may be designed, in part, to cripple the economies of those states and thus aid the Communist effort to destroy the Marshall Plan.

The employment of armed force, leading to territorial control, has been principally responsible for Communist successes in recent years in China, North Korea, Indochina, Burma, and Malaya. Armed forces represent a major asset of the Communists (in comparison with other Communist resources) in Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia.

d. Exploitation of Labor Groups where a Sizable Proletariat Exists.

Although labor groups in most of Asia are relatively small and unorganized, in those areas containing a sizable proletariat the Communists employ standard methods, such as general strikes, agitation and propaganda, and continual wage demands. Communist movements derive their principal support from urban labor in Japan, India, and Thailand. Labor provides important support to the Communists in China, the Philippines, and Korea.

e. Methods of Control.

Uniformity of application of Communist doctrine is assured by the intensive study and training in Soviet and Communist methods which is undertaken by most of the Communist leadership, and by the constant exchange of "information" through Soviet and local Communist periodicals, and the Cominform Journal. Specific Soviet instructions for minor policy decisions are unnecessary. Considerable latitude is allowed Communist leaders in the application of Communist principles, subject, of course, to review by the USSR.

2. Communist Methods in Individual Asiatic Countries.

a. China.

(1) The Party and its Methods.

China has been the scene of world Communism's greatest success outside the USSR itself, and has been an experimental center for those areas which are industrially backward, largely illiterate, poor, and non-democratic. Innovations have been added to Leninist doctrine by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) theoreticians, but these have concerned tactics, not basic revolutionary principles. The CCP has maneuvered successfully through the dangers of "right opportunism," through which initiative in the revolution would be lost, and "left extremism," which would prematurely attempt to transform a "bourgeois democratic" into a more advanced "socialist" revolution.

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The CCP has exploited a nationalist and anti-imperialist movement in China for 30 years, and is still doing so. In each case, its principal external "enemy," whether the UK, Japan, or the US, has been the power regarded by Moscow as most dangerous to Soviet designs in Asia. Founded in 1921, the CCP was quickly accepted into the Comintern. In 1924, the CCP, by direction of the Comintern, entered its first 'united front.' In 1927, Chiang Kai-shek, realizing the Soviet-CCP aim of absolute domination of China, expelled the Communists from the Kuomintang. After 10 years of Communist-Kuomintang military conflict, during which period the Communists were always on the defensive, the Communists and the Kuomintang, in opposition to Japanese aggression, once again formed a "united front." The CCP agreed at this time to abandon its policy of armed insurrection, and to give up sole control of its armies; after 1944, however, the principal Communist military effort appears to have been directed more against the Kuomintang than the Japanese. In the years of the second "united front,"--maintained precariously from 1937 to 1945--the Chinese Communists greatly expanded their influence and the territory under their control; throughout this period, CCP political tactics were directed toward maintaining, in the Party, the drive toward Communist dictatorship, while at the same time attracting the support of patriots, moderates, and liberals. Currently, the CCP's attitude toward the minor parties which have attached themselves to it, and which are to participate in the "coalition" government, is one of utter cynicism. These parties, useful in conciliating various elements of Chinese society, are to be employed briefly as tools of the CCP, and will not be permitted to exercise any independent power.

The "rightist" leadership of the CCP, which had been following the orders of the Comintern, was discredited in 1927 when the CCP was expelled from the Kuomintang. The "leftist" leadership which succeeded it, from 1928 to 1930, and which also followed Comintern directives, was discredited by the disastrous failure of its "proletarian revolution." During both of these periods, Mao Tse-tung (now chairman of the CCP) was attempting to build the Chinese Communist movement upon an organized and armed peasantry; this policy was endorsed by Stalin, and later, when it seemed destined to succeed, by the Comintern. The CCP's agrarian reform program -- reduction of rent, interest-rates and taxes, and the redistribution of land -- in many areas won for the CCP considerable popular support, indispensable to the CCP's early survival, and, later, in waging guerrilla warfare against the Japanese and civil war against the Nationalist. Until recently, however, the CCP was not forced to feed the cities at the same time that it instituted rural reforms; and there was little popular realization that the redistributed land would eventually be collectivized. This year, the CCP, in orthodox fashion, decided to shift the center of gravity of Party work from the rural areas to the cities, depriving the peasantry of its place of primacy in the revolution. Recent peasant revolts, however -- probably in

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response to excessive requisitions of food and men -- presumably have impelled the CCP to proceed cautiously in its efforts to advance the proletariat at the expense of the peasantry.

After their expulsion from the Kuomintang in 1927, the Chinese Communists acquired control of a small area in Southeast China and organized an army to protect it. The Communists expanded and strengthened their army, survived repeated Nationalist attacks, and, finally, transferred the base of their power to the northwest. The CCP saw clearly that the army was essential to the control of territory. For the past 20 years, in fact no significant area in China has become Communist other than through military occupation.

During the Sino-Japanese war, the Chinese Communists waged successful guerrilla warfare, expanded their territorial control, and moved toward Manchuria immediately after V-J Day. Soviet occupation forces obstructed the movement of Nationalist troops into Manchuria, and made large stocks of Japanese materiel available to Communist forces. Throughout the period of negotiations between the CCP and the Kuomintang, after the US had arranged a temporary truce in early 1946, the Communists steadfastly refused to allow their armies, under any political agreement, to be broken up and amalgamated into the Nationalist forces. In the summer of 1947, the CCP began again to realize by predominantly military means its goal of domination of all of China. For the past two years, the strength and tactical successes of Chinese Communist military forces have been by far the most important of the Party's positive assets, although an equally important factor has been the debility, corruption and ineptitude of the Nationalist regime. Communist forces, over-whelmingly superior to the scattered anti-Communist opposing them, are capable of extending their control through almost all of China by the end of 1950.

The CCP's tactics in the "united front" periods were very successful, and even now are fairly successful, in conciliating opposition to the Communist program among various elements of Chinese society. In Chairman MAO's "New Democracy" (1940), he envisaged a smooth and prolonged transition period between the "bourgeois democratic" and "socialist" revolutions, solicited the cooperation of the bourgeoisie, stated that the Soviet form of government was not practicable for colonial and semi-colonial countries, and, in general, minimized the severity of the social and economic measures contemplated by the Communists. Recently, with military victory assured, Chairman MAO has stated the Communist position much more frankly. MAO now states flatly that the new government of China is to be a dictatorship of "the people" (those supporting the CCP) over the "reactionaries" (those opposed to the CCP), and that only the CCP will be entrusted with determining the popular will (which, of course, will be identical with the desires of the CCP leadership). MAO still proposes to cooperate, temporarily, with the middle classes, but he warns his followers

to beware of them, and has emphasized that the middle classes will be subordinated to the proletariat. The welfare of the latter class is to be the CCP's primary concern. In addition, MAO explicitly promises the collectivization of agriculture; although foreseeing a "grave problem" in forcing the peasantry to accept collectivization, MAO insists that it must and will be done. MAO's latest statements emphasize that the CCP will adopt, wherever practicable, the techniques of the USSR.

(2) CCP Aims in Asia.

The CCP hopes to unite one billion Orientals in a Communist Asia, led by the CCP and oriented toward the USSR. The USSR has perhaps delegated to the CCP — with its overseas branches or cells in every country of the Far East — at least some measure of responsibility for building, in MAO's words, "a bulwark of world Communism in Asia." The principal Soviet problem in this effort is perhaps one of retaining control over the Asiatic Communist movement. The CCP's major problem is probably that of overcoming the widespread hostility in Asia toward both the alien doctrine of Communism and the prospect of Chinese domination. In addition to the great encouragement which Chinese Communist successes presumably have given to other Communist movements in Asia, there are likely to be material repercussions, especially in those countries neighboring China which have large Chinese minorities, well-organized CCP branches on both. The CCP has denounced Western occupation authorities and has made overtures to the countries concerned (Japan, South Korea), has denounced "reactionary" colonial governments (Indochina, Malaya), threatened retaliation against "fascist" native regimes (Thailand, Philippines), attempted to extend its influence into native independence movements (Indonesia), promised protection to overseas Chinese communities, and greatly expanded its influence in such communities. As the CCP consolidates its control in China, there is no doubt that it will engage in more aggressive operations throughout Asia.

b. Korea.

The Communist Party in Korea achieved limited success in the years before V-J Day mainly through successful attempts to identify itself with and lead the nationalist, anti-Japanese movement. The end of the war in the Pacific liberated Korea from Japanese control and brought military occupation by the US and the USSR. Since that time, the USSR has directly supervised all Communist tactics in Korea with the aim of enforcing conversion of the entire country into a "people's democracy" and a Soviet satellite.

(1) Northern Korea.

(a) Development of the Party.

Achievement of Communist objectives was simplified in the northern zone, where the presence of the Soviet Army made possible the immediate establishment of Communist control. With Soviet assistance and direction, a group of native and emigré Korean Communists assumed direction of local affairs and gradually established the institutions of a "peoples democracy." Continued Soviet control of all phases of activity is ensured, however, by the presence of Soviet political advisers, technicians, and military advisers, and through devices such as joint-stock companies and barter trade agreements.

Although police methods give the Communists firm control of northern Korea, they are not prepared to adopt immediately the political and economic forms of an advanced Soviet state. The government is the standard Communist transitional expedient of a "popular front," designed to lure all progressive, non-reactionary, nationalist parties, classes, and social groups into participation in the Communist program. Although the Communists do not attempt to conceal and in fact proclaim at every opportunity, the dependence on the USSR, they also continue to pose as leaders of Korean nationalist, anti-imperialist forces.

The Communist movement did not achieve sizable support from the Korean peasantry before the Liberation. The land policy used in northern Korea since the liberation reflects the semi-colonial state of the economy and the ideological backwardness of the peasants and workers. Land was expropriated and redistributed, but title remains vested in local Communist government organs (Peoples Committees), and the farmer is permitted to occupy land only so long as he is cooperative and meets the production and tax quotas of the government. This technique provides a means of enforcing peasant support for an unpopular regime and also will simplify collectivization at some later date when the peasants have become more firmly indoctrinated and the general economy further developed.

Development of internal security forces and a Peoples Army was a matter of first priority in northern Korea, and Soviet troops were not withdrawn until the security forces were considered sufficiently loyal and strong to maintain Communist control against either internal reaction or invasion from southern Korea. The Soviet-trained-and-equipped People's Army now has an estimated strength of 56,000 and is expanding. Internal security forces, armed with Soviet and Japanese weapons, number approximately 57,000. The North Korean armed forces could repel an invasion from South Korea, but would probably require assistance from Communist China



for successful offensive action against the defenses of the southern zone.

Labor and Other Groups.

Active support for the Communist regime comes from only a small minority of the northern Korean people and is centered in labor, youth, and the intellectual class. A large amount of effort is being expended, however, to increase the base of support by "educating" the masses while eradicating "feudal" and "colonial" forms of society that inhibit the ideological success of Communism. Attempts are being made to break down the traditional Confucian family relationships; landlord-peasant relations have been obliterated, Christians have been forced to compromise their faith or suffer police action, and the people are continually lectured on the general superiority of Soviet culture, spread through the channels of the North Korean Soviet Friendship Associations, and the sending of delegates to Soviet-sponsored international conferences, designed to further Soviet prestige.

(2) Southern Korea.

(a) The Party and its Methods.

In southern Korea, the Soviet aim of enforcing conversion of all Korea into a satellite "peoples democracy" has been delayed by the presence of US troops, by UN intervention, by the establishment of a violently anti-Communist, independent government (the Republic of Korea), and by continued US military and economic assistance to that regime. Communist strategy and tactics have been designed; (1) to end US and UN assistance, (2) to induce the collapse of the Republic, and to extend Communist control by "unification" of the "fatherland" under the aegis of the northern regime. Soviet directed Communist action against the principal targets-- US aid, UN support, and the stability of the Republic-- is carried on both within the Republic's borders and from northern Korea, while the USSR carries the action against the targets on the international stage.

Nationalism.

In the first months after V-J Day, Communist strategy called for united front tactics in southern Korea to lead all liberal elements in a struggle for complete "liberation" and self-government. The complete subservience of the Korean Communist movement to Soviet direction was revealed in January 1946, and the movement lost much of the prestige and support it had gained while leading the anti-Japanese resistance. Although the Communists continued their attempts to influence and control all social and political groups other than "reactionary" elements through united front tactics and extensive organizational activity, they were gradually isolated and eventually forced completely underground by the

severe anti-Communist program adopted by the government of the Republic after its inauguration in 1948.

At present, the Communists are increasingly emphasizing united front tactics in southern Korea, with appeals to nationalism and attacks on US "imperialism," UN interference, and the government of the Republic, which is labelled a "tool" of US "colonial policy." Through the device of a "Democratic Front for the Unification of the Fatherland," the Communists hope to exploit the universal Korean desire for national unity and to undermine support of the Republic. If this method, combined with intimidation, sabotage, guerrilla activity, infiltration of the government and army, and terrorist propaganda, fails to effect the collapse of the Republic, then the People's Army of the North may be used for a full scale invasion to "unite" Korea and restore to power the "rightful" organs of the people, the long defunct People's Committees.

The Communists attempted to gain peasant support in southern Korea by the usual slogans calling for expropriation and redistribution of the land, and by subtle propaganda calculated to stir peasant resentment against the government and the US aid program. Although the majority of peasants have not accepted Communist leadership, a few have been induced to join guerrilla bands, and Communist propaganda has often been successful in confusing or misleading the farmer on matters of vital local concern. Successful land reforms in southern Korea and knowledge of the unhappy results of Communist "land reforms" in northern Korea have lessened the effectiveness of Communist appeals to the peasants in the southern zone.

After the collapse of the Communist united front movement in early 1946, the Communists turned increasingly to violence, which resulted in their being forced underground. Underground activity, supported by funds, trained agents and propaganda from the USSR, and by infiltrated guerrillas from northern Korea, now includes a broad variety of standard Communist techniques designed to alienate the people from the Republic, to undermine the government's stability, to increase fear of Communist strength in Asia, to effect the collapse of resistance to Communist domination, or to weaken resistance sufficiently to facilitate invasion by the People's Army. Communist propaganda claims the re-establishment of People's Committees in areas "liberated" by the guerrilla forces, but actually the guerrillas have not attempted to hold territory, as their capabilities do not exceed hit-and-run raids on isolated villages.

Propaganda dissemination to aid the accomplishment of ultimate political control is closely integrated with all Communist activity. Much of the propaganda work is carried on by agents on the local levels in the form of "education" and indoctrination of peasants, workers, and students, in order to secure their support for immediate Party objectives. In their effort to win

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control, the Communists appeal for support to all classes except the landlords, "pro-Japanese traitors," and "reactionary tools of American Imperialism." Although the greatest effort is directed toward youth groups, workers and peasants, Communist slogans and propaganda are slanted to appeal to the particular grievances and aspirations of all classes.

(b) Relations with Chinese Communists.

Communist successes in China have contributed greatly to the confidence of the northern Korean regime and have increased the fear in southern Korea that eventual Communist domination is inevitable. The CCP maintains close liaison with northern Korean leaders, has agents in the southern zone, and can provide military and economic assistance to the northern regime if it so chooses. It is anticipated that, in the event of a northern Korean regime decision, to invade southern Korea, military assistance would be provided by the CCP. Although several Korean Communist leaders have close ties with the CCP through years of work in Yenan and with the 8th Route Army, the influence and control of the USSR remains paramount.

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
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d. Indochina.

(1) The Party and its Methods.

The activities of the Indochinese Communists have been confined almost exclusively to Vietnam and no significant indigenous

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Communist movement has appeared in Laos or Cambodia. By 1930, three different parties in Vietnam, each of which described itself as Communist, were merged to form the Indochinese Communist Party, an affiliate of the Third International. Repression undertaken by the French Administration during the early 1930's crippled the activities of the young Party. Nevertheless, in World War II, the Communist became increasingly active, following the Japanese occupation of Indochina, and formed the aggressive anti-Vichy and anti-Japanese nucleus within the wartime resistance organization known as the Viet Minh.

The basic Communist appeal in Indochina, as elsewhere in southeast Asia, has been to nationalism, and, in the interest of a united front, the Party declared its own dissolution in November 1945. Individual Communists were invited to join the Association for Marxist Studies, a forum for discussion of Marxism. A coalition of nationalist parties and associations, including the Communists, then formed the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam. The President is Ho Chi Minh, a Moscow-trained Communist leader. The most powerful political force in the Republic is the Viet Minh Front, which embraces most of the parties in the resistance and enjoys a position in the Ho Chi Minh regime approaching one-party rule. Most, but not all, of the important members of this Front are former members of the Indochinese Communist Party. Vietnamese Communist control of the policy of the resistance government is probably considerable, though not necessarily absolute. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam appears, at the present time, to be something between a genuine, well-balanced coalition and a monolithic structure in which Communist domination is complete and unchallenged. The policy of the government is not, strictly speaking, Communist policy; it is the policy of a government in which Communists play a dominant role.

Very little is known of Communist policy which is carried out independently of the Ho Government. The Association for Marxist Studies, which carries on a characteristic Communist party line propaganda, is nominally a private organization, although it is said to have the blessing of the resistance government. Reports that the Viet Minh Front promotes Communist objectives through its extensive organization, including secret schools for the training of political agents, are difficult to confirm. It may be assumed that the Vietnamese Communists continue to constitute a tightly-knit faction which is attempting to promote its own collective ends by covert propaganda. The prominent positions enjoyed in the present government and in the directing committee (Tong Bo) of the Viet Minh Front by former members of the Indochinese Communist Party put them in a highly advantageous position where these ends are concerned. All political parties in Vietnam, however, have nominally subordinated their respective policies to support of the Ho regime and the attainment of national independence and unity.

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Land policy has been, in general, conservative. There has been no widespread confiscation and redistribution of land, although the holdings of certain absentee landlords and "traitors" have been so treated. The Ho Government receives much of its support from propertied persons, and has avoided measures likely to alienate them.

Peasant support has been gained through: (1) abolishing of the long-detested and corrupt mandarinat; (2) capitalizing on the long-standing and almost universal hatred of French control; (3) providing the population with at least the illusion, and to some extent the reality, of controlling its own affairs; and (4) disciplining or liquidating "traitors," "moral delinquents," profiteers, and corrupt officials.

The Ho Chi Minh regime, since late 1945, has been challenging the authority of the French to reoccupy Vietnam. At present, Ho's forces control most of the countryside (between 80 and 90 percent of the territory of Vietnam), while the French maintain tenuous control over the urban centers. The Ho regime, while not yet in a position to launch an attack in force against any major position which the French are determined to hold, is determined to continue the fight until all French "imperialists" are forced to withdraw from the country. Regarding arms supply, the capacity to manufacture arms locally is steadily increasing, while the advance of the Chinese Communists will facilitate smuggling across the Sino-Tonkinese border.

On the labor front, Communist activity has been primarily concentrated among the Chinese and Vietnamese workers in the Saigon-Cholon area with the instigation to strike presumably coming from Chinese Communist organizers known to be active in that area. The Vietnam Confederation of Labor, which is apparently well organized in zones under Ho's control, is a member of the WFTU.

## (2) Other Tactics.

Vietnam organizations have been especially active in Communist-dominated international organizations. Messages of support have been dispatched for almost every important international Communist occasion.

A Communist text book, believed to have been prepared in 1945 and used for indoctrination in the resistance zones, contains very definite statements on the Peoples' Revolution:--leadership of the proletariat; a democratic bourgeois revolution which at the same time must be an anti-imperialist and agrarian one rather than a purely anti-French nationalist revolt; confiscation of the properties of the church,

of French imperialists, and of foreign and reactionary native capitalists; and the watchword "Support the USSR." There is no direct or conclusive evidence that this "line" has been disseminated since November 1945. However, it has been recently reported that Communist activity and influence have increased in resistance-controlled areas of South and Central Vietnam, where there has been increasing anti-US and anti-religious propaganda and where children are being placed in camps for instruction in Communist doctrine.

### (3) Connections with Chinese Communists.

Strenuous attempts have been made by French security and intelligence services to control the growth of Communist activity in the Chinese communities in Indochina. Chinese Communist organizers have however been operating among the overseas Chinese since World War II through schools and small commercial establishments. Efforts have been directed primarily at students and workers, particularly in the Saigon-Cholon area where the Chinese population is especially large. At higher levels, there is evidence of disagreement between Vietnamese Communists and emissaries from the Chinese Communist Party, although many French reports have attempted to show extensive collusion between the two groups, particularly on the military level. French official circles have admitted that no Chinese Communist "treaty" with the Ho regime has been "uncovered to date," thus refuting French propaganda from other sources which have charged that such a document has been signed between representatives of the Ho Government and the CCP in June 1948. However, regardless of the presence or absence of a formal treaty, preparations may have been made for cooperation between Chinese Communist and Viet Minh Front forces in the China-Indochina border area. It is not known whether Ho Chi Minh, recognizing the danger of Chinese domination, is prepared to accept extensive assistance from the CCP; it is most probable, however, that assistance will be proffered.

#### e. Thailand.

##### (1) The Party and its Methods.

The most important Communist influx into Thailand has been from China, notably after the 1927 exclusion of the Chinese Communists from the Kuomintang, and again after World War II. In 1933, Communist activities led the Thai Parliament to promulgate an act outlawing espousal of Communism or the formation of an association for such a purpose. Despite this measure, the Thai Communist Party (TCP) was formally established in 1935. In 1946, Thailand, desiring UN membership and fearing a probable Soviet veto, repealed the Anti-Communist Act.



Very little is known about the TCP, and it may be little more than a component or extension of the large Chinese Communist organization in Thailand. The TCP's membership is probably limited to a handful of Thai intellectuals and industrial workers. The Party publishes a weekly newspaper which faithfully follows the anti-imperialist and pro-USSR line of the Chinese Communist papers in Thailand. The TCP is believed to be directing its efforts toward increasing its strength in the small Thai labor force.

While the TCP cannot be considered of particular current or potential importance in Thailand, the Communist movement among overseas Chinese resident in Thailand presents a reliable and effective instrument for active extension of Communist influence, and possibly for control. Communism centers almost exclusively in the three million overseas Chinese in Thailand most of whom reside in the Bangkok area. This minority (1/6 of the Thai population) comprises the major part of Thailand's commercial class and urban labor force; approximately 3-4,000 Chinese are estimated to be active Communists. The Chinese Communist organization, like the TCP, operates underground. Relative to the total population, the Communist movement is of little significance; it is, however, achieving results disproportionate to its numerical strength and is wielding a growing influence as China progressively falls under Communist domination.

Only during the last war has there been any identification by the Communists with a nationalist and anti-imperialist movement. At that time, a "popular front" was formed which included Thai and Chinese Communists as well as the purely nationalistic Free Thai underground. This loosely organized coalition (non-governmental) broke up after the war, and since then, neither the TCP nor the Thailand Chinese Communist organization has been known to be identified with any of the groups in opposition to the subsequent Thai Governments.

In Thailand there is no militant prosecution of a Communist program; both Communist groups refrain from arousing Thai isolationist and nationalist sentiments. The Chinese, particularly, attempt to avoid any involvement in Thai affairs; and the TCP is notably lacking in any concrete program for support of revolutionary movements in neighboring areas. The TCP in 1947, by publicly denying that its objectives parallel those of the Chinese movement, tacitly admitted that association with the Chinese in Thailand is politically damaging. In addition, although admitting to support of the world Communist movement, the TCP denied contact with the Communist Party in China and the USSR. Recently, however, there has been indications that the fiction of distinct Communist organizations and objectives in Thailand may no longer be considered necessary.

No known support for the Communist movement is derived from the peasantry as a result of Communist land policy. The majority of the Thai population is agricultural, but there are no serious agrarian problems. Although landlordism exists, a large percentage of the agricultural population is composed of land owners. The Communist appeal for peasant support is limited primarily to advocating a wider distribution of the profits deriving from rice exports and the establishment of more effective farmers' cooperatives.

While Communists in Thailand are believed to be well organized and disciplined, their small military force is believed to have been largely dissipated through the activities of the Phibul regime in 1948-49. Inadequate information precludes analysis of total Communist military capabilities at the moment. The Chinese Communists are, however, believed financially capable of acquiring sufficient arms to permit the creation of a hard-hitting, though small, military force which could render invaluable assistance in any attempt to create disorder in Thailand.

Because the Thai Government and the KMT organization in Thailand have repressed it, the Communist movement, until lately, has made little progress. After Chinese Communist armies moved into south China, however, relaxation of Thai Government and Nationalist Chinese pressure has permitted the expansion of Communist activities in the press, labor organizations, educational institutions, and welfare associations. The greatest headway is being made in the labor force and among students mainly through the press and study groups. Thailand's only important labor organization, the Central Labor Union, is predominantly Chinese and is believed to be Communist-controlled. It was admitted to the WFTU in January 1949. An accelerated Communist propaganda campaign, arguing for accommodation to the Mao regime and repudiation of the Western "imperialists," is believed to be gaining credence not only among Thailand Chinese but also among important Thai political and military leaders.

(2) Connections with other Communist Movements.

Contact and liaison between the TCP and CCP and with other SEA Communist movements is assumed, but only fragmentary and unconfirmed evidence is available to support this view. Similarly, contact with the Soviet Legation is indicated but not adequately confirmed. The Legation is conducting a very discreet program, confined apparently to the distribution of films, press releases and other information media, which assiduously avoids involving Thai and Chinese Communist personalities or organization.

As the Communist organizations in Thailand experience greater freedom of action, it is believed that closer cooperation will be evidenced and that there will be an increase in the movement of personnel between Thailand and China.

f. Burma.

(1) The Party and its Methods.

Although sporadic Communist activities were carried on by a small group of Burmese during the mid-1930's, a cohesive Communist movement did not begin to evolve until 1942, when all Communist-inclined Burmese united in common opposition to the Japanese. Primarily responsible for the amalgamation of various elements of the resistance into the Anti-Fascist Peoples' Freedom League (AFPFL), members of the Burmese Communist Party (BCP, organized in 1944) held key positions in this organization until an opposition group within the AFPFL split the Party and forced the withdrawal of both factions. The Communist Party of Burma (CPB), popularly called Red Flags, was organized in March 1946 as an outgrowth of the BCP and almost immediately commenced a campaign of violence. The BCP, temporarily avoiding violence, unsuccessfully sought a rapprochement with the AFPFL-supported government. In January 1948 the BCP radically altered its policies, and, after a series of strikes and a campaign of vilification against the Burmese Government, began a full-fledged Communist insurrection.

Both the Burma Communist Party and the Communist Party (Burma) are attempting, by a variety of methods, to undermine and discredit the Burmese Government's authority. The most effective political technique has been the exploitation of the intense Burmese nationalism. Their claims of being the only true nationalists in Burma, and their accusations that the existing government is perpetuating Burma's political and economic bondage through subservience to Anglo-American "capitalist-imperialists," have gained fairly wide acceptance. The Communists also attack the government as Fascist, corrupt and a supporter of landlordism. Simultaneously, the Communists are making a determined effort to combine as many dissident and disgruntled groups as possible into a "New Democratic Front," and organization under Communist domination designed to be their vehicle for the assumption of power.

Approximately 80 percent of the Burmese population is engaged in agriculture, and the preponderance of support for the Communists comes from the peasantry. The Communists' simple explanations of the average Burman's difficulties coupled with glowing promises of a Communist utopia, have met with considerable success. Their program of non-payment of rents and taxes and non-repayment of government loans to

cultivators has been well received, as has their promise of equitable redistribution of land along lines almost identical with those practiced by the Chinese Communist Party.

Burmese Communist military techniques generally parallel those of other Communist parties in the Far East. While the ultimate objective is to overthrow the non-Communist regime in power, the more immediate goal is to create maximum unrest and to retard economic stabilization. Therefore, Communist military activities have usually taken the form of opportunistic attacks by small guerrilla bands over a widespread area. Pitched battles with government forces are avoided whenever possible, unless the Communists hold a distinct advantage. Through violence, the Communists seek to facilitate their rise to power by weakening the country's economy. Their activities are designed to undermine the government's financial structure, by forcing excessive nonproductive expenditures, restricting production, exports and revenues, disrupting communications and looting government funds and property—particularly arms and ammunition.

In view of the widespread acceptance of Marxist theory in contemporary Burmese politics, it has been a simple matter for Communists to infiltrate and influence numerous student, labor, agricultural and cultural organizations. The Communists have been responsible, directly or indirectly, for several strikes and anti-government demonstrations sponsored by these groups. Furthermore, although regular Communist publications have been suspended, the Communists have been able to produce clandestine handbills and pamphlets which receive rather free circulation. In addition, several vernacular newspapers still faithfully follow the Communist line with impunity. Where persuasion has failed, the Communists have not hesitated to resort to sterner measures, including intimidation, extortion and outright violence. In areas under their control, they have established parallel administrations which reputedly rule with a heavy hand. Uncooperative local government officials are summarily dealt with—often through sentence imposed by "People's Courts."

## (2) Foreign Connections.

The Burma Communist Party probably still maintains liaison with the Communist Party of India, which is believed to have forwarded Soviet instructions ordering the Burmese Communists to commence their insurrection. Although there is no direct substantiating evidence, it is entirely possible that the Burmese Communists are in contact with Communists in China, Indochina, and Thailand. The works of Mao Tse-tung, and Chinese Communists' policies in general, have

influenced Burmese Communist strongly, and it is possible that their allegiance will shift away from India to China in the near future. The Chinese Communists will then be in an excellent position to provide the Burmese Communists with advisers and material.

g. Indian Subcontinent.

(1) The Party and its Methods.

The Communist Party of India (CPI) as it exists today—a strong, centralized, well-disciplined organization with rapidly increasing membership and considerable influence in labor unions and peasant organizations—began its development in 1920. From an estimated two or three thousand members in July 1942, the CPI had grown to 9,000 by April of 1943, to 25,000 by March of 1944, and, at the present time, probably to some 80,000 enrolled members. If to the latter are added those peasants, who, though not technically members of the party nevertheless subscribe heartily to Communist doctrines and have already indicated an enthusiastic willingness to follow Communist leadership, the number probably amounts to several hundred thousand or more.

The current policy of the CPI involves overt opposition to and harassment of the Indian and Pakistan governments in the same fashion as its earlier policy involved opposition to the then British Government of India. Acceptance of the British proposal for the creation of India and Pakistan is pictured as constituting a betrayal of the revolutionary struggles within India. It involved, say the Communists, a deal between Britain and the bourgeois leadership of both Dominions to turn over control to the latter, while leaving the capitalist-imperialist structure intact as a means of avoiding threatened revolution and to provide credits, capital goods, and markets for Indian industrialists. In the CPI view, it is impossible for Nehru's bourgeois government to become the instrument of the "people's will"; the confidence of India's masses in that government, and in Nehru personally, must be undermined by Communist groups through direct attacks and by infiltration of the ranks of the Congress and the armed forces. Similarly, a vehicle—freed from the taint of pro-Indianism—must be provided the peoples of Pakistan for the overthrow of their "reactionary and feudalistic" government. For that reason, there was created in West Pakistan the Communist Party of Pakistan.

The efforts of the CPI have traditionally been directed primarily toward recruitment of members among industrial workers, and toward control of organized labor. Attainment of this latter objective appeared to have been secured shortly after the war through domination

of the principal trade union group, the Indian Trade Union Congress (ITUC). To counteract this development, there was created in 1946, the Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC), under sponsorship of the Indian Congress Party. The INTUC now numbers among its members about a million workers, as opposed to some 600,000 in the ITUC. A third labor group, equally hostile to the Communists, is the recently organized Hind Mazdoor Sabha, sponsored by the Socialist Party. This group also contains some 600,000 members. The Communists still remain strong, however, among the port workers and in the railway repair shops, and it is believed that their strength might be sufficient at the present time to permit a serious and perhaps catastrophic dislocation of port activities and railway transportation if India should adopt a position unsatisfactory to the Communists in the event of war.

While the Communists' principal effort in India has heretofore been directed toward industrial labor, organization and indoctrination of the farmers have not been neglected and may in the immediate future constitute the main Communist endeavor. The Kisan Sabhas (peasant groups), organized in 1936 on an all-India basis and numbering a half million or more, are believed to be almost entirely Communist dominated. The flight of Communist leaders to the villages, in view of police action against them in Bombay, Bengal, and Madras; and general harassment elsewhere by the government authorities, may materially increase the CPI's emphasis upon indoctrination of the agrarian masses.

There is no evidence that the Communists have infiltrated the armed forces of India, Pakistan, or Ceylon to any significant extent. The Communists have no organized armed forces of their own.

## (2) Ceylon.

Figures regarding Communists in Ceylon are not available. The port workers in Colombo are known, however, to be Communist-led, and some Communist sympathy exists among the Tamil employees of the rubber plantations. Elsewhere there is little evidence of Communist activity. The Communists' position is weakened, moreover, by the existence on the Island of three rival Communist parties, in each of which membership is believed to be nominal. Some Communist representation in the Ceylon legislature has been obtained, however, through the success of Communist candidates in relation to issues other than Communism.

### (a) Relations with the Chinese Communist Party.

CCP successes are certain to heighten the morale of the CPI. When Chinese Communist forces occupy the province of Yunnan,

they will be separated from India only by a narrow neck of Burma. It is impossible to judge whether the CCP plans to extend significant material assistance to the CPI. The CCP's successes, however, will tend to attract the Burma Communist leadership away from the CPI, and the CCP is likely to replace the CPI as adviser to the Burmese Communists. The Chinese Communist regime will, of course, attempt to establish diplomatic relations with the governments of India and Pakistan.

#### h. Malaya.

##### (1) The Party and its Methods.

The Malayan Communist Party (MCP), although not of major concern before World War II, had an estimated 15,000 members before it was outlawed in September 1939. Communists were undoubtedly behind many of the strikes which broke out after 1936 among laborers employed by rubber estates, tin mines, the Singapore transit system, and the Singapore Harbor Board. During the war, Malayan Communist played an important role in organizing guerrilla operations against the Japanese and were active in the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army. Early in 1948 Communist-inspired-and-directed labor disturbances broke out in Malaya and shortly thereafter the MCP, together with several Communist-infiltrated labor unions and political organizations, was again declared illegal. Many Communists went underground and took up arms with the Malayan People's Anti-British Army (MPABA), formed from the still-remaining nucleus of the former Anti-Japanese Army.

Since the majority of the guerrillas are alien Chinese, the terrorist movement cannot be termed a genuine expression of nationalist aspirations, but it is definitely "anti-imperialist" in concept and therefore distinctly anti-Western. The aim of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) is "to unite all classes that can join in the revolution to establish an anti-imperialist national united front, to widely mobilize the masses for the purpose of frustrating the colonial policy of the British imperialists, of safeguarding the vital interests of the masses, and of proceeding with a determined struggle to strive for national independence and emancipation." Furthermore, the MCP clearly considers the US as "the leader in the imperialistic anti-democratic camp." MCP propaganda, however, has been directed principally against British "imperialism" and the British soldier, and is designed to enlist the support of larger numbers of Malaya's population.

"The strength in the mass struggle," according to the MCP, "naturally has for its foundation the lower stratum of workers and peasants." Support from the lower stratum of workers and peasants, however, has been gained largely by intimidation and extortion; voluntary

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contributions to the MCP are thought to be slight. Guerrilla bands have been able to obtain, through intimidation, large sums of money and quantities of food and clothing from Malaya's half-million Chinese squatters (immigrant or war-displaced persons illegally occupying land), and the terrorists have also used squatter areas as "cover." Military support has been slight—the terrorists number between 3,000 and 5,000, with probably several hundred "hard core" Communists in positions of leadership. Although the MCP tries to enlist the support of all races, only the Chinese have been noticeably sympathetic, and these in small numbers.

Terrorist militant tactics have included: (1) slashing rubber trees, (2) damaging tin mine equipment, (3) attacks against power lines, (4) attacks against rail and road transportation, and (5) ambush and murder of civilian and military personnel.

There are indications that the terrorists in the latter part of 1948 changed their strategy from that of attempting to disrupt the economy and overthrow the government in a short campaign of violence, to one in which the objective is to gain control of the country gradually.\* The new strategy calls for: (1) gaining popular support, (2) establishing guerrilla posts within terrorist-controlled areas, (3) enlisting aid of rubber-tappers and other laborers to grow food in guerrilla areas, (4) continuation of the recruitment and training campaign, and (5) continuation of the offensive, but only against soft objectives.

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Before the outlawing of the MCP and certain Communist-infiltrated labor unions, the main strength of the MCP was in the labor field. Under close surveillance of the British, unions are now thought to be relatively free of Communists, but it is known that a major objective of the MCP is the infiltration of existing unions and

\* (It may be significant that the guerrillas ceased their program of damaging rubber trees and tin mines at the same time that a Soviet delegation arrived in Malaya to negotiate the purchase of rubber. The USSR is also attempting to acquire Malayan tin from the UK.)

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and the establishment of new ones. As for the middle-classes, the MCP feels that the bourgeoisie is too dependent on the colonial economy to make a useful partner.

## (2) Relations with Chinese Communists.

CCP military victories have probably had a solutary effect on terrorist morale, but so far there is little evidence of direct aid from the Chinese Communists. The CCP radio has promised "moral and material aid wherever possible" to colonial areas in southeast Asia and has begun to beam to Malaya broadcasts by Malayan Communist labor leaders now in Peiping.

Malaya's 2.5 million Chinese have not yet, at least overtly, displayed mass sympathy toward the CCP; they are, as a group, non-committal toward the civil strife both in China and in Malaya. However, several Chinese-language newspapers in Malaya are becoming increasingly anti-KMT, and their circulations are rising. In addition, several influential Malayan Chinese leaders have manifested interest in establishing friendly relations with the CCP. In order to protect their families and interests at home, Chinese in Malaya, as elsewhere in southeast Asia, will probably not oppose the regime in power in China.

## 1. Philippines.

### (1) The Party and its Methods.

The Communist Party of the Philippines (PKP), which now has approximately 3,000 active members, was officially organized in 1930. It has engaged in little overt activity but has become increasingly vocal during the past year.

Communist leaders have stated that their maximum goal is the establishment of a Communist state in the Philippines. Their more immediate goal, however, is the achievement of a "people's democracy" which would provide conditions under which capitalism could "better develop its productive capacity for the benefit of the overwhelming majority of the people."

Among the principal demands of the PKP are the abrogation of the US-Philippine Trade Agreement, the removal of US troops and bases from Philippine soil, the break-up of feudal estates for distribution among the peasants, and the removal of "monopoly-feudal fetters" from industry. The PKP propagates its philosophy and its demands through press statements, public forums, and front organizations.

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The PKP does not engage independently in politics but supports candidates of other parties, infiltrates political organizations, or attempts to gain partisan support for its own candidates. The Democratic Alliance, a political party, is often cited as a Communist-front organization and is undoubtedly infiltrated. There are no known Communists currently serving in the national government.

The Communist movement obtains support from the peasantry through the Hukbalahap—an armed organization confined to central Luzon which is resisting government authority. This support is based partly upon Huk propaganda, which advocates the break-up of large estates, and in part upon coercion.

The Huks are fluidly organized and highly mobile. By means of guerrilla tactics and with the support (voluntary or otherwise) of the local populace, from whom new members are recruited, the Huks are able to thwart attempts of the Philippine Constabulary to eliminate their operations and break up the organization. The Constabulary is able to move into Huk-held territory and dissident control of specific areas is, therefore, temporary. The Huks do not at present constitute a serious threat to the Philippine Government or to US interests, but they are a drain on the Republic's resources and may contribute to its future instability.

Communists are leaders of the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO), which is the largest and most active labor organization in the Philippines. In pursuing labor advancement, the CLO follows a policy of progressive dissatisfaction regardless of management concessions, and its resolutions on national and international affairs have become increasingly pro-Communist. The CLO became a member of the WFTU in 1949.

## (2) Relations with Chinese Communists.

Very little is known of Chinese Communist strength and activity in the Philippines. Communist broadcasts in China have denounced the Philippine Government as "Fascist." Local Chinese Communists operate covertly but are believed to be active among Chinese labor, to have infiltrated Chinese schools, and to be circulating underground publications. Current liaison between the Chinese Communists and the Huks, including financial assistance, is frequently reported but has not been reliably confirmed.

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j. Indonesia.

(1) The Party and its Methods.

The first organized Communist activities in Indonesia began about 1920, and initially, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) worked together with rebellious elements of a Moslem nationalist organization, Sarikat Islam. The PKI was outlawed by the Netherlands Indies Government in 1926, largely as a result of a series of Communist-fomented labor disturbances. Communist and Moslem differences became apparent at about the same time, and the two factions ceased to collaborate. The PKI went underground at this time and continued its underground activities throughout the Japanese occupation. After the proclamation of the Republic, 17 August 1945, the PKI came back into the open and formed a united front with the Republicans.

Communist factions in Indonesia rely chiefly upon the nationalist slogan "Merdeka" (Freedom) for popular appeal. Communist propaganda originally was directed against the Dutch and US "imperialists," but more recently the Hatta-Sukarno group of moderate Republicans has been assailed as "puppets." Radio Moscow has referred to these men as a "bourgeois feudal clique," indicating that Indonesian Communists have been excluded—or have withdrawn—from the "united front."

Previously, however, the PKI advocated national unity, and continued its vocal support of the Republic even after some Party leaders were arrested in March 1946 by the nationalists. The Republican government also dissolved the People's Front and arrested its leader, Tan Malakka—a Communist denounced by Moscow for his strongly nationalist position. He was released in September 1948 to ensure the neutrality of his rather considerable following when the Republic was engaged in putting down an attempted coup by PKI groups led by Moscow-trained Muso.

A number of Communist and left-wing organizations merged into what finally became the Partai Murba, which, despite rumors of Tan Malakka's death, continues to function as a super-nationalist force opposed to any form of collaboration or discussion with the Dutch. The PKI is disorganized and has lost several of its best leaders, but it apparently is attempting to form a new "national front" in the fight against the Dutch and the Republican government. Ultra-nationalistic Moslems seem willing to support guerrilla activities of both Communist groups against the Dutch and Republican forces.

The Communist factions in Indonesia will continue to use their demand for complete independence from the Dutch and other

imperialists as their chief appeal to the peasantry. The agrarian issue, as such, is not easily susceptible to Communist exploitation.

No reliable estimate for over-all armed Communist strength in Indonesia is available, but Communist forces in Java, the major area, may run as high as 50,000. In some districts, particularly West Java, Communist armed strength has been supplemented by the addition of fanatic Moslem forces.

(2) Connections with other Communist Movements.

Chinese Communists in Indonesia apparently are not cooperating with indigenous Communists in the promotion of common objectives. There is evidence however that liaison is effected between the Chinese Communists and both Indonesian Communist movements. Chinese communities in Indonesia, totalling two million persons, are becoming susceptible to overtures from the CCP, and Chinese Communist agents have made progress in the penetration of information organs, schools, labor unions, clubs, and study groups.

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